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CEPAL REVIEW No. 22 
The Crisis 
in Central America: 
its origins, scope 
and consequences* 
About two years ago, the ECLA Mexico Office prepared 
a note in which a warning was given that the Central 
American economies were beginning to suffer rapid 
deterioration on account of factors of both external 
and internal origin, and that if" nothing was done to 
deal with this situation it could imperil the level of 
economic interdependence reached through the in-
tegration programme. In order to lessen or even re-
verse these depressive tendencies, it was proposed that 
machinery should be set up to heighten international 
collaboration, with a view to strengthening the activi-
ties which the countries of the region would have to 
carry out themselves. 
Since then, it has been observable that the situation 
of the Central American economies has been eroded 
to an even greater extent than was foreseen in that 
note, that international co-operation has not played 
the role which was expected of it, and that the degree 
of economic interdependence previously reached has 
undergone a decline. 
Given the seriousness of the situation, in which are 
combined an economic and a political crisis that are 
without precedents in recent times, and in view of the 
widespread confusion as regards the way to tackle 
these crises, it has seemed appropriate to go more 
deeply into their causes, characteristics and conse-
quences, and to put forward some suggestions 
regarding possible policy options which governments 
might adopt. 
The present article makes no claim to offer global 
solutions or set models for solving problems of such 
great complexity, rather does it emphasize the novel 
nature of the present crisis and formulate some guide-
lines which could facilitate these countries' adaptation 
to the changed circumstances inside and outside the 
region. Within these guidelines, particular stress is laid 
on the activities which could be embarked upon jointly 
in order to check further economic deterioration and 
even, if possible, reverse the negative trends of recent 
years. 
*Prepared by the ECXA Mexico Office 
I 
Introduction 
Central America is passing through a profound 
crisis in both the economic and the political and 
social spheres: areas so closely interlinked that it 
would be idle to try to determine whether one 
took causal precedence over the other. The fact 
is that since the beginning of the 1980s the region 
has been simultaneously sunk into the deepest 
economic depression and racked by the most 
serious political upheavals of the last fifty years, 
so that it is living through a climate of instability 
and confusion. It is hard to find viable solutions 
on the political, economic or social level. 
The origin, scope and possible consequences 
of the crisis cannot be understood without ana-
lysing the main features of the evolution of the 
economies and societies of Central America since 
the war. The first aspect which strikes one is the 
dynamic growth achieved over a 30-year period 
—naturally with differences from one country to 
another— within an atmosphere of financial and 
monetary stability. A second notable aspect is the 
decisive influence of external factors, which have 
been essential determinants not only of econom-
ic behaviour, but also of the mutual influence 
of many political factors. Herein lie the historical 
roots of the repeated propensity of Central 
Americans to look abroad for explanations and 
solutions of the problems that beset them. 
Furthermore, the fragmentation of Central 
America —since the short-lived federation broke 
up— has also contributed to the fact that each of 
the countries has resigned itself historically to 
having scant room for manoeuvre with regard to 
its own destiny, owing to the preponderance of 
factors beyond its control. 
A third remarkable feature is that, in the 
thirty years since the end of the Second World 
War, most of the considerable changes under-
gone by the economies of the region have been 
simply juxtaposed to the economic and social 
structure which already existed before, and have 
made no essential difference to a process re-
ferred to in the present article as 'superimposed 
development'. 
Lasdy, the fruits of the long period of econom-
ic expansion which took place after the Second 
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World War were distributed in a flagrantly in-
equitable manner among the different population 
strata within the framework of a concentrative 
—or at least exclusive— process which precluded 
any significant relief of the extreme poverty that 
persists in the region. 
In addition to the foregoing constants, men-
tion must be made of more recent phenomena of 
internal and external origin which might well 
herald a break with the development model and 
with former patterns of political interaction. 
Thus, there are new challenges to the develop-
ment of the Central American economies and 
dangers to political coexistence at the national 
1. Economic dynamism 
The first special feature of the development of 
the Central American countries during the last 
three decades was undoubtedly its sustained 
dynamism. The gross domestic product of the 
region as a whole grew at an annual rate of 5.3% 
in real terms between 1950 and 1978, with differ-
ences of degree among the various countries (the 
highest rates corresponding to Nicaragua and 
Costa Rica and the lowest to Honduras). As a 
result, per capita real income practically doubled 
dur ing this period. Even between 1970 and 
1978, when the region had to face exceptionally 
grim problems —the rise in hydrocarbon prices, 
imbalances in the international financial market, 
shortages of raw materials and of some food-
stuffs in 1974-1975, several droughts and three 
large-scale na tura l catastrophes—, the real 
annual growth rate averaged more than 5.6% 
per year. 
Some other features of this growth may also 
be noted (see figure 1 ). First of all, during the 28 
years in question negative growth rates were re-
corded only on a very few occasions, almost al-
ways associated with some natural disaster (twice 
in Honduras and once in Nicaragua and Costa 
Rica). Secondly, while there were frequent 
and even the regional levels by which all the 
countries are affected. The crisis could itself give 
rise to opportunities for improving the situation, 
however, if innovative responses to the region's 
economic and social problems materialize. 
In the following pages, first and foremost, 
the features of the period after the war are ana-
lysed, and more recent phenomena are then ex-
amined. Consideration is next given to short-
term prospects and to a number of possibilities 
for at least reducing the negative effects of the 
crisis or even seeking to reverse them within the 
framework of a development model different 
from that which has prevailed in the past. 
—almost annual— cyclical fluctuations, these 
took place against a background of notably stable 
growth. The cyclical downturns were brief; only 
exceptionally did the product fall for two years 
running in any of the countries. Lastly, the cycli-
cal evolution of the gross domestic product of the 
five countries showed great similarity, reflecting 
both their common form of insertion into the 
international economy and the high degree of 
economic interdependence achieved through 
the integration commitments of the 1950s and 
1960s. 
The most dynamic sector was generally 
manufacturing, to which impetus was given by 
the expanded market and the industrial develop-
ment policies created as part of the integration 
process. As a result, the region's degree of indus-
trialization rose from 12.3% in 1960 to 16.8% in 
1978. 
2. The decisive influence of the external sector 
The steadiness with which the Central American 
economies grew largely reflected the long boom 
in the international economy which followed the 
Second World War. During that period, the in-
dustrialized countries grew at a cumulative 
II 
Features characterizing Central America's development 
style since the war 
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Figure 1 
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annual rate of 5.0%, while the volume of world 
trade expanded at a rate of 9.0%. Albeit in differ-
ent degrees, all the countries of the region man-
aged to take advantage of this situation: the value 
of their exports of goods and services to coun-
tries outside the region increased by a factor of 
thirteen between 1950 and 1978, rising from 
US$ 250 million to US$ 3.2 billion, while the ex-
port sector was significantly diversified, as re-
gards both the composition of its products and 
their geographical destination '. The boom in the 
traditional export sector also created conditions 
easy enough to facilitate the bold decision to 
adopt reciprocal free trade in virtually all prod-
ucts originating from the region within a space 
of not more than five years. This was responsible 
for the industrialization drive which eventually 
became a second source of dynamic growth, 
although this never ceased to depend ultimately 
on the evolution of the traditional external sec-
tor. The easy economic situation referred to, 
together with the region's intensive moderniza-
tion process, likewise helped to create consump-
tion patterns in certain strata of the population 
which imitated those of more advanced societies 
and accentuated demand for imported goods. 
During the 1960s and 1970s the external 
sector of the Central American countries under-
went significant changes. The relative impor-
tance of foreign trade tended to increase —the 
export and import coefficients for the region as a 
whole rose from 18.6% and 16.3%, respectively, 
in 1950 to 30.4% and 33.6% in 1978—;2 the 
structure of exports and imports changed radi-
cally —the former included a growing propor-
tion of non-traditional articles, while within the 
latter the proportion of intermediate and capital 
goods increased—; intra-Central American 
trade expanded rapidly until it accounted for a 
high and mounting percentage of the total ex-
ports of each of the countries, inasmuch as it 
became a more and more important source of 
the total imports of each; and movements on the 
capital account acquired progressive significance 
as the gap in current transactions widened and 
'For the region as a whole, in 1950 the main export 
product of each country contributed 70% of the total foreign 
exchange generated by exports of goods. This proportion 
went down by practically half in 1970 (36.1%), thanks to the 
diversification of the export sector, although it rose again to 
45% in 1978 because of the high prices prevailing that year 
for coffee, which carries a great deal of weight in the total 
value of exports. Furthermore, in 1950 80% of Central 
America's external trade was conducted with a single country 
(the United States), but this share dropped to 35% in 1978. 
2If reciprocal trade is excluded from these figures, the 
export coefficient for the region as a whole evolved as fol-
lows: in 1950, 1960 and 1978, respectively, it was 18.5%, 
16.7% and 23.5%; while in the same years the coefficient of 
imports from outside the region was 16.2%, 19.8% and 
27.3%, respectively. 
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new sources of international financing, both 
public and private, became available. As a result, 
the servicing of the external debt began to absorb 
an increasingly large proportion of the foreign 
exchange generated by exports of goods and 
services. 
Even so, throughout this period of growth, 
diversification and change in the external rela-
tions of the region, the essential feature of those 
small agricultural-export economies persisted: 
the evolution of the external sector largely ex-
plained the global economic behaviour of the 
economy, while the constraints originating in 
that sector set a limit to the rate of domestic 
economic activity. A direct relationship is thus 
observable between the level of exports on the 
one hand, and the rates of economic expansion, 
capital accumulation, investment, procurement 
of fiscal revenue, level of employment and 
import capacity, on the other. 
External financing acted as a shock-absorber 
during periods of contraction, preventing drops 
in the value of exports from being reflected auto-
matically in a limitation of the capacity to import 
(and hence on the growth capacity of the econ-
omy), and at the same time it also facilitated the 
process of'superimposed development' referred 
to below. But when a weakening of external 
demand coincided with a restriction of the flow 
of external financing (which served at least partly 
to make up for the fall in exports), the constraints 
originating in the external sector had the effect 
of inhibiting economic growth and even bringing 
about a contraction in economic activity in real 
terms. 
The influence of external factors on events 
in the countries of the region was not confined to 
the economic sphere. Some of the consequences 
of Central America's dependence on exports 
profoundly affected the shaping of its societies 
and the political order prevailing in them. It is 
common knowledge, for example, that the cul-
tivation of one or two basic export products had a 
decisive influence on the division of labour, be-
cause of the intensive and seasonal nature of 
manpower requirements for the crops con-
cerned. The availability oflabour has thus played 
a vital part in the economic development of the 
region as well as in determining the dual and 
interdependent nature of export and subsistence 
agriculture, and these facts largely explain, in 
their turn, the inequitable income distribution 
structures. 
The organization of the Central American 
economies around one or two export products 
has also profoundly influenced the 'patterns of 
authority': the symbiotic relation between domi-
nant economic groups (agricultural exporters 
and traders) and governments, the legacy of cor-
ruption from colonial times, and the historical 
use of repressive methods to ensure the availabil-
ity of labour have helped to consolidate the au-
thoritarian and non-participative systems, char-
acteristic of the period since the war, which have 
taken different forms from one country to 
another, or within a single country at different 
times (the main exception being Costa Rica). 
Furthermore, factors of external origin have 
also decisively influenced political interaction in 
the countries of the region. The virtual hege-
mony exercised by the United States since the 
signing of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty in 1850 has 
taken a new form in the period since the war 
because of the latent conflict existing between 
the two leading superpowers of the world. This is 
not the place to go into detail about the role of 
United State foreing policy in Central America 
—a topic which has been the subject of many 
studies in recent years—,3 but it is worth stressing 
3
 While it must be admitted that reference to a to-and-f'ro 
movement between 'realism' and 'idealism' in the foreign 
policy of the United States represents an oversimplified de-
scription, it is nevertheless backed up by some searching 
analyses. See, for example, the description given by Dexter 
Perkins of cycles of 'quietism' and 'activism', in The American 
Approach to Foreign Policy, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Uni-
versity Press, Revised edition, 1962, chapter VII, pp. 136-
155. In other cases it is grounded on what Stanley Hoffmann 
describes as the 'dualism' of the United States style of foreign 
policy, one of whose manifestations is that of speaking two 
different languages, neither of which is entirely convincing, 
and which are difficult to reconcile, the first being the lan-
guage of power and the second the language of community 
and harmony. Or, as Hoffmann himself puts it even more 
graphically, only a symbolic eagle can easily hold both arrows 
and an olive branch at the same time (see Gulliver's Troubles or 
the Setting of American Foreign Policy, New York, McCraw-Hill 
Book Company for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1968, 
pp. 177-178). Finally, the alternation between 'realism' and 
'idealism' in foreign policy is also substantiated by Samuel P. 
Huntington's recent description of the United Stales' political 
system, one of whose essential features, in his view, is the gap 
between political ideals and political realities. Huntington 
recognizes that such a gap exists in all societies, but asserts 
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the considerable influence which the United 
States has acquired in the region. There is no 
question, of course, of ascribing to the United 
States an omnipotent role, or of insinuating that 
Central American events depend entirely on the 
designs of one or the other of the superpowers, 
since interaction between the national political 
actors has its own dynamics; but it may neverthe-
less be maintained that the United States has 
shown a capacity for fixing the limits of political 
interaction in the countries of the region by 
throwing its umbalancing weight on the side of 
the national actors whose position is closest to the 
postulates of its own foreing policy. 
Of course the preferences of United States 
policy have not always formed a coherent set of 
objectives: some administrat ions have been 
mainly concerned with security —above all the 
'containment of communism'— while others 
have been more interested in gradual orderly 
change towards more pluralistic and equitable 
societies. In this connection, United States gov-
ernments have sometimes supported national 
actors who advocate order ly and peaceful 
changes, within the framework of a foreign poli-
cy vis-à-vis the Latin American countries which 
some authors have called 'idealistic'. This hap-
pened, for example, when the United States 
favoured the heterogeneous alliances which 
overthrew dictatorships in Guatemala, El Salva-
dor and Honduras in the period following the 
war, or the governments which p romoted 
changes under the 'Alliance for Progress' in the 
1960s, as well as when possibly somewhat reluc-
tant support was given to the similarly heter-
ogeneous alliance which assumed power in 
Nicaragua in 1979. On other occasions, the 
United States Government has preferred to help 
national actors who, in its opinion, have the best 
thai the United States is distinguished by its manner of 
approaching it: namely, through four responses differing 
from one another but all forming part of a 'cyclic pattern' that 
begins with 'moralism', which seeks to eliminate the gap; falls 
into 'cynicism', which tolerates it; moves on to 'complaisance' 
which contrives to ignore it; and ends with 'hypocrisy', which 
denies its existence. And after that the cycle begins all over 
again with 'moralism*. See American Politics: The Promise of 
Disharmony (Cambridge, Mass., The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1981), pp, 3, 42, 64 and 68. 
qualifications for ensuring a minimum of 
stability in the face of radical challenges to the 
status quo. The best example of this more 
'realistic' policy might perhaps be the support 
given by the United States administration to the 
forces which overthrew the elected government 
in Guatemala in 1954. 
At all events, when contradictions have 
arisen in United States foreign policy —as has 
happened fairly often— between the objective of 
promoting orderly change and that of avoiding 
threats to security, United States governments 
have invariably preferred to support those actors 
in each country whom it has considered most 
capable of defending their own interests. It is in 
this way that the governments in question have 
managed to fix the geopolitical limits referred to 
earlier. 
3. Superimposed development 
Of course the economies and societies of the 
Central American countries are very different 
from what they were thirty years ago, not only in 
quantitative respects —the gross domestic prod-
uct rose from US$ 1.95 billion to US$ 7.52 
billion (at 1970 prices) between 1950 and 1980, 
while over the same period the population in-
creased from eight million to over 20 million 
inhabitants— but also because important qualita-
tive changes have taken place. The societies are 
much more segmented and pluralistic; a note-
worthy feature is the appearance of middle-
income strata attributable partly to the progres-
sive urbanization (only 16% of the population 
lived in urban areas in 1950, compared with 43% 
in 1980); the importance of secondary sector 
activities in the economies has increased (their 
relative participation climbed from 14.6% to 
24.1% between the two dates mentioned) and in 
general the system of production has been mod-
ernized and diversified year by year. The differ-
ent geographical regions within the countries 
are now much better integrated, thanks to the 
heavy investments made in the physical trans-
port and communications infrastructure, and 
advances have even made in the supply of educa-
tion and especially health services. These 
changes are to be attributed essentially to the 
'spill-over' caused by the style of development 
which has predominated in all the countries 
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—albeit with specific characteristics varying from 
one to another— over the whole period under 
analysis. It may be considered that these changes 
have generally speaking been the only ones per-
mitted by those who have had the possibility of 
keeping changes within certain limits, outstand-
ing among these actors being those who obtained 
their economic power under the aegis of the 
agricultural export pattern which is so vital to the 
region's historical development style. Conse-
quently, it may be said that the considerable 
changes which have taken place in the three de-
cades since the war are characterized essentially 
by the way in which the new economic and social 
strata were gradually juxtaposed with those 
already existing, in the course of a process of 
change and modernization which did not in es-
sence threaten the pre-existent economic struc-
ture. 
The foregoing is simply another way of ex-
plaining an evolutionary process of peaceful 
change: as long as the pre-existent structures are 
not eliminated, then all the changes occurring in 
development patterns must, by definition, be of 
an additive or superimposed nature, although 
they need not necessarily be scorned on that 
account. 
What it is desired to stress here, however, is 
t h a t w h e n t h e s e c h a n g e s have ser ious ly 
threatened the existing structures and vested in-
terests, they have almost invariably found the 
way ahead barred, above all when the interests of 
the dominant groups have been identified —as 
has frequently (but not always) occurred— with 
those of the leading international actor in the 
Central American political arena, in the terms 
already referred to in previous paragraphs. 
Thus, peaceful and orderly changes or reforms 
have had to keep within very tight limits in most 
of the countries of the region. To put this 
another way, economic progress has caused an 
important social change, with many groups ris-
ing in the income scale and with the formation of 
middle classes, but the maintenance of the histor-
ical pattern of development has determined a 
slow and halting advance by the political institu-
tions. The gap between economic change and 
strengthening of the political practices and in-
stitutions required by a more complex society is 
part of the background of instability in Central 
America. 
This essential characteristic of 'superim-
posed development' has frequently obliged gov-
ernments to seek substitutes for changes which 
perhaps might run the risk of exceeding the 
limits aforesaid. Thus, for example, recourse was 
had to external financing partly in order to post-
pone or take the place of increases in the tax 
base; State land was distributed in what were 
called 'land settlement' programmes, in prefer-
ence to a restructuration of land tenure systems; 
and external saving was used as a substitute for 
(instead of a complement to) the inadequate 
machinery for tapping domestic saving. 
By the same token, the tax burden came to be 
an interesting indicator of the constraints which 
'superimposed development' had to face in 
Central America. Although important changes 
took place within the taxation system in all the 
countries —as a reflection of the changes which 
were coming about in the system of production— 
it is curious that tax revenue, as a percentage of 
the gross domestic product, remained constant 
in some countries or grew at only a dawdling 
pace in others (see table 1). Furthermore, this 
coefficient of taxation was extremely low com-
pared with that of other countries of similar eco-
nomic and social structure, a circumstance which 
should not be considered merely accidental: en-
trepreneurial and labour organizations in all the 
countries —albeit in different degrees— stub-
bornly resisted rises in levels of taxation, espe-
cially taxation on production and income. The 
financial constraints due to the scanty procure-
ment of fiscal revenue severely limited the capac-
ity of the public sector to play a more active role 
in development, while a growing proportion of 
the modest increases achieved in the coefficient 
of public expenditure (see table 2) was financed 
through borrowing, especially from external 
sources. 
The public sector's limited participation in 
the gross domest ic p roduc t , as measured 
through procurement of tax revenue and central 
government expenditure, also fitted in with the 
'anti-dirigisme' position of the dominant groups 
in Central American societies. In the 1950s and 
1960s, the public sector was gradually taking 
control of such public services as the generation 
and distribution of electricity, telephone com-
munications, rail transport and port and har-
bour management, while State activity was also 
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Source: F.CLA, on the basis of official data. 
^Provisional figures. 
Table 2 
CENTRAL AMERICA: COEFFICIENT OF TOTAL CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE, 































































Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
"Provisional figures. 
strengthened with the establishment of public 
development banks and institutions for regula-
ting commodity prices. In all countries, however, 
the public sector scrupulously avoided partici-
pating in activities of interest to private enter-
prise, the main exception to this rule being 
perhaps the Costa Rican financial intermedia-
tion system. 
Another example of the persistence of pré-
existent structures in the processes of change 
under discussion was the low level of backward 
or forward integration of traditional agricultural 
export activities, in the sense that the sectors 
depending on these have not tried to diversify 
systematically in order to invest in more complex 
activities. The appearance of new agricultural 
export lines (cotton, sugar and meat) meant no 
more than a repetition of the pattern of tradi-
tional basic commodities, with their scanty link-
ages with other productive activities. In other 
words, traditional producers diversified but lit-
tle, and the State shared only slightly in the sur-
plus generated by them. This gives an idea of the 
way in which the traditional economic and social 
structures were perpetuated and of how the 
changes so often mentioned were simply juxta-
posed with them without altering them in es-
sence. That is to say, the changes occurred only 
within relatively narrow limits (although these 
varied somewhat from country to country). 
Thus, despite the considerable expansion and 
change wich took place in the Central American 
economies and societies in the thirty years follow-
ing the war, that change was, paradoxically, not 
sufficient to meet the growing expectations of 
large sectors of the population. Furthermore, 
the instinctive desire to preserve vulnerable so-
cial systems led in most of the countries to the 
maintenance of the existing economic patterns 
—which were able to take advantage of the boom 
in the international economy— based on political 
institutions that were of an exclusive nature, at 
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least as regards the distribution of power and of 
the fruits of economic development. Conse-
quently, the social mobilization and spill-over 
effects which accompanied the postwar boom 
were not able to offset, in a comparable sense, the 
backwardness of some political structures. 
4. The exclusive nature of development 
Hence, despite their economic dynamism, the 
countries of the region were not capable during 
the thirty years after the war of significantly im-
proving income distribution or of reducing the 
number of Central Americans living in a state of 
extreme poverty. According to household sur-
veys carried out in recent years, the poorest 20% 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data from the countries. 
Source; F.C;I.A, on the basis of official data from the countries. 
* Urban sector. 
of the population has less than 4% of the national 
income at its disposal, while at the other extreme 
the most affluent 20% obtains more than 55%. 
There are considerable differences from one 
country to another, the most dissimilar features 
corresponding once again to Costa Rica (see table 
.3). In countries where surveys were carried out at 
different times, the available evidence —albeit 
the methodologies used were not always compa-
rable— indicates that the gap between the 
groups at the two extremes of the scale widened, 
even though the relative share of the intermedi-
ate strata may have tended to increase (see table 
4). In the case of Guatemala and Costa Rica, the 
per capita real income of the poorest 20% of the 
population actually went down. 
Table 3 
CENTRAL AMERICA: STRUCTURE OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND PER CAPITA 
INCOME LEVELS, BY COUNTRIES, TOWARDS 1980 
(Dollars at 1970 prices) 
Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua 
Strata 
Average Average Average Average Average 
income income ° income income c income 
Poorest 20% 4.0 176.7 2.Ü 46.5 5.3 111.0 4.3 80.7 3.0 61.9 
30% below the mean 17.0 500.8 10.0 155.1 14.5 '202.7 12.7 140.0 13.0 178.2 
30% above the mean 30.0 883.8 22.0 341.2 26.1 364.3 23.7 254.6 26.0 350.2 
Richest 20% 49.0 1 165.2 66.0 1 535.5 54.1 1 133.6 59.3 796.3 58.0 1 199.8 
Table 4 
CENTRAL AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF FAMILY INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE 1970s 
{Dollars at 1970 prices) 
Strata 
Poorest 20% 
30% below the mean 
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In absolute figures, out of a total of over 20 
million Central Americans in 1980, some 13.2 
million (64%) were living in a state of poverty 
—in the sense that their income did not cover 
their basic needs— while over 8.5 million (41%) 
did not even have sufficient income to pay for the 
minimum shopping-basket of food considered 
necessary to meet their biologico-nutritional re-
quirements (see table 5). The situation was much 
more serious in rural than in urban areas, and 
there were considerable differences from one 
country to another (in Costa Rica, less than 25% 
of the population lived below the threshold of 
poverty, whereas in Guatemala the correspon-
ding proportion was over 70%). Moreover, 
although in all likelihood the percentage of Cen-
tral Americans living in a state of poverty nowa-
days is less than it was 30 years ago, it is neverthe-
less true that in absolute terms, because of 
population expansion, there are now more poor 
people (and also more people who are not poor) 
than in the period immediately after the Second 
World War. 
In short, the region's characteristic develop-
ment style has been concentrative, or at any rate 
of an exclusive nature in the sense that it has 
favoured the different strata of the population in 
a flagrantly inequitable manner, accentuating 
the degree of income concentration in some 
countries. Likewise, although 30 years of rapid 
and sustained economic expansion have gone by, 
over half the population of Central America 
—and three-quarters of those living in rural 
areas— do not have sufficient income to cover 
their essential needs as regards food, housing, 
clothing and basic services. 
It should be noted that the exclusive pattern 
of development is not confined to the economic 
and social sphere. If it were possible to speak of a 
truly typical characteristic of political interaction 
in most of the Central American countries, then 
this characteristic would be the absence of broad 
popular participation, reflected in the virtual ex-
clusion of the masses, and specially the rural 
masses, from political activity. Neither the indus-
trialization nor the urbanization which have 
taken place since the end of the war have been 
able to bring about a decisive change in the still 
essentially agricultural nature of these societies. 
With a few exceptions, the masses working in 
rural areas continue to be passive observers in-
stead of organized actors in the evolution of the 
political systems. This exclusive feature has had a 
decisive influence both on the characteristics and 
on the scope of the various modernization pro-
jects undertaken in the region. 
Thus, with one exception, the lack of effec-
tive participation by the emerging social classes 
meant that they were not in a position to coun-
terbalance the weight of the traditional power 
groups in the handling of public affairs, and this 
sometimes increased the tensions between the 
rapid social development and the slow institu-
tional development in the political sphere. 
To put this in another way, except in the case 
of Costa Rica, political interaction in Central 
America has generally been of an elitist nature 
and has not been able to include the region's 
most numerous population groups in the pro-
jected modernization of its societies. To do this 
would have meant perhaps eliminating, possibly 
by degrees, the factors of authoritarianism re-
ferred to above, and undertaking the con-
sistently postponed reforms aimed at fulfilling 
the legitimate aspirations of the groups which 
have so far been virtually excluded from the 
benefits of development. 
Il l 
Recent events and the current economic crisis 
1. The break with historical trends 
In 1977-1978 the trends briefly described above 
reached a turning-point, at least as regards sus-
tained economic growth. Since that two-year 
period, a progressive slowdown has occurred, 
culminating in negative rates in all the countries 
(1982) (see figure 1). The duration, intensity and 
peculiar characteristics of this situation have no 
Table 5 
CENTRAL AMERICA: ESTIMATED INCIDENCE OF POVERTY TOWARDS 1980 
Whole of 
Central America Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala'
1 Honduras1 ' Nicaragua 
Total 
In a state of 
poverty 
Extreme poverty 
Basic needs not 
satisFied 
Not in a state 
of poverty 
Total 
In a state of 
poverty 
Extreme poverty 
Basic needs not 
satisfied 
Not in a state 
of poverty 
Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural 
20 696 8 315 12 381 
13 178 3 738 9 440 
8 647 2 130 6 517 
4 531 1608 2 923 
7 518 4 577 2 941 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
63.7 45.0 76.2 
41.8 25.6 52.6 
21.9 19.4 23.6 
36.3 55.0 23.8 
Thousands of persons 
2 213 1011 1202 4 747 2 119 2 678 
549 138 411 3 267 1221 2 046 
300 75 225 2 427 943 1 484 
249 63 186 840 278 562 
1 664 873 791 1 530 898 632 
Percentage breakdown 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
24.8 13.6 34.2 68.1 57.6 76.4 
13.6 7.4 18.7 50.6 44.5 55.4 
11.2 6.2 15.5 17.5 13.1 21.0 
75.2 86.4 65.8 31.9 42.4 23.6 
7 262 2 485 4 777 3 691 1 229 2 462 2 733 1 471 1 262 
5 166 1 168 3 998 
2 879 418 2 461 
2 287 750 1 537 
2 096 I 317 779 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
71.1 47.0 83.7 
39.6 18.8 51.5 
31.5 30.2 32.2 
28.9 53.0 16.3 
2 515 540 1975 
2 092 376 1716 
423 164 259 
1 176 689 487 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
68.2 43.9 80.2 
56.7 30.6 69.7 
11.5 13.3 10.5 
31.8 56.1 19.8 
1681 671 1 010 
949 318 631 
732 353 379 
1 052 800 252 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
61.5 45.6 80.0 
34.7 21.6 50.0 
26.8 24.0 30.0 
38.5 51.4 20.0 Source: ECLA, Central American Basic Needs Project, on the basis of data from the countries and CKI.AOÍ-., Boletín Demográfico, Vol. XIV, No. 28. 
a Urban/rural population breakdown corresponds to Figures from the 1979/1980 family income and expenditure survey, 
b Urban/rural population breakdown corresponds to Figures from the 1978/1979 family income and expenditure survey. 
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precedent in the period since the war. Suffice it 
to say that, after 30 years of expansion in the five 
countries' per capita income (with only sporadic 
interruptions), there has been a sharp and perva-
sive decrease during the last five years. In Costa 
Rica, Guatemala and Honduras the absolute 
level in late 1982 barely equalled that recorded in 
1976. In El Salvador and Nicaragua the situation 
was even more dramatic, since real per capita 
income had slipped back to the levels of the first 
half of the 1960s. 
In addition, the process of economic integra-
tion, which had earlier allowed the downward 
fluctuations in the international economy to be 
offset, changed direction and became a factor 
which magnified the crisis. Due to the depth of 
the crisis, together with political circumstances 
and the lack of a strategy of regional scope, the 
economic interdependence of the five countries 
has tended to become a mechanism that trans-
mits recessionary economic forces. 
The fact that the pronounced deterioration 
in the evolution of the economies has coincided 
with a period of increasing political upheaval 
may be functionally related to some of the char-
acteristics of Central American societies men-
tioned before. Some of the many manifestations 
of those characteristics led to a questioning of the 
social order which involved violent challenges to 
the status quo, and these, in turn, gave rise to 
similarly violent responses which contributed to 
a rapid polarization of positions in some coun-
tries, especially Guatemala, El Salvador and 
Nicaragua. There are many complex and 
mutually-reinforcing interrelationships among 
the local political and economic factors and the 
way in which both intermix with external influ-
ences. These phenomena will be briefly ex-
amined below. 
2. The impact of exogenous phenomena 
It is not by chance that the economic crisis has 
affected all the countries, regardless of the de-
gree of social peace or upheaval prevailing in 
them, the economic policy objectives pursued, or 
the differences in relations between the public 
and private sectors. All have been seriously 
affected by factors of external origin. This has 
been inevitable because the common denomina-
tor affecting them all has been the profound 
recession in the international economy which, as 
already noted, to a great extent determines the 
overall behaviour of the Central American econ-
omies and even imposes a limit upon their abil-
ity to grow. Now, in addition to the world reces-
sion, the economic effects of the political crisis 
—discouragement of private investment, flight 
of capital, difficulties in attracting external 
financing— have combined and have reinforced 
one another to the point where they have pro-
duced an economic breakdown unlike any seen 
in Central America since the 1930s. 
With respect to the effects of the disarray in 
the international economy, it may be recalled 
that, in addition to the industrialized countries' 
difficulties in 1978-1979 —low growth rates, 
high rates of inflation, decreased savings, lags in 
the application of technological innovations— 
hydrocarbon prices went up again in 1979. Still 
greater importance could perhaps be attributed 
to the attempts to modify economic policy made 
by some industrialized countries which have 
stressed the fight against inflation —with some 
success— and have resorted, inter alia, to restric-
tive monetary measures that have been reflected 
in high interest rates. These policies have un-
doubtedly contributed to the slowdown of econo-
mic activity in the countries where they have 
been implemented, as well as in the world econ-
omy in general, with the resulting repercus-
sions on the levels of international trade. This 
situation has weakened demand for the Central 
American countries' traditional exports. Given 
the persistent international inflation (although 
recently it has begun to decline), the weakness of 
demand produces a marked deterioration in the 
terms of trade. What is more, in the financial 
sphere, the Central American countries have 
been adversely affected by the high interest rates 
on their massive foreign debt and by their recent 
difficulties in gaining access to new external 
financing. 
The figures in tables 6 and 7 speak for them-
selves. With the decline in the prices of virtually 
all the products exported by Central America 
and the continued upward pressure on the prices 
of its imports —especially hydrocarbons in 1979-
1980—4 the region's terms of trade have deterio-
4For the region as a whole, the relative share of 
petroleum in total imports rose from 4.4% in 1970 to 10.7% 
in 1976, 18.7% in 1980 and 21.6% in 1981. 
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rated by almost 50% since 1977, while the pur-
chasing power of its exports has fallen by 30%. In 
general terms, this means that if the 1977 pur-
chasing power of exports had been kept up, the 
total value of exports in 1982 would have been 
40% greater than it was, whereby approximately 
2.0% would have been added to the gross domes-
tic product in the latter year. 
Table 6 
CENTRAL AMERICA: MAIN FOREIGN TRADE INDICATORS, 1976 T O 1981 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
Since 1978, the terms of trade have been 
negative each year in all of the countries. In 
addition, there has been a decline in the volume 
of the exports of some countries (including prod-
uct lines, such as nickel in Guatemala, which 
have actually ceased to be exported because of 
lack of demand) as well as increasing difficulties 
in incorporating new export items because of 
market constraints and the protectionist mea-
sures which some industrialized countries have 
put into effect, and a considerable decrease in 
certain exports of services, such as tourism, due 
not only to the world economic recession but also 
to non-economic factors in Central America. 
On the other hand, productive activity in the 
Central American countries required imports, in 
spite of the recession, especially in order to meet 
the demand created by the increased public 
spending which the governments promoted, 
partly in order to counteract the sluggishness of 
private investment. As a result, the trade deficit 
of the five countries jumped from US$ 432 mil-
Table 7 
















































- 8 . 2 
-17 .6 
-9 .7 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
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Table 8 
CENTRAL AMERICA: BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS TRADE ACCOUNT POSITION 
AND ITS RATIO TO GDP, 1975 T O 1981 













- 5 7 0 -427 
Millions of dollars 
•432 -887 -653 
1981 
-1323 -1411 
- 1 6 6 
- 7 9 
- 7 7 
- 1 0 1 
- 1 4 7 
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- 1 2 
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As a percentage of 
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- 5 . 3 
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- 1 . 8 
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- 4 2 5 
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7.7 
- 4 6 0 
- 5 1 
- 2 1 6 
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-10.1 
- 1 . 5 
- 2 . 8 
- 7 . 7 
-17.1 
- 1 0 7 
- 1 6 9 
- 5 4 8 





- 6 . 3 
- 6 . 2 
-18 .2 
Source: EC:LA, on the basis of official data. 
Table 9 
CENTRAL AMERICA: BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS CURRENT ACCOUNT POSITION 
AND ITS RATIO T O GDP 
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- 1 1 5 
- 4 7 
-3.7 
- 8 . 4 
- 0 . 5 
- 1 . 8 
- 8 . 9 
- 2 . 5 
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-573 
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- 1 3 9 
- 1 9 2 
-1 088 
-364 
- 2 4 9 
-271 
- 1 7 0 
- 3 4 
-880 
-554 




As a percentage of GDP 
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- 1 1 7 
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- 3 . 4 
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-13 .1 
-17 .4 
- / 965 
- 3 8 2 
- 2 3 9 
- 5 6 0 
- 2 8 5 




- 6 . 5 
-14.1 
-19 .7 
Source: EGI.A, on the basis of official data. 
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lion in 1977 {equal to 2% of GDP) to more than 
US$ 1.4 billion in 1981 (6.8% of GDP) (see table 
8). In addition, there was a spectacular increase 
in debt servicing, attributable not only to larger-
scale borrowing but also, and in particular, to 
soaring interest rates. External factor payments 
rose, for example, from US$ 268 million in 1977 
to US$ 700 million in 1981 for the region as a 
whole. This accounts for the fact that the current 
account deficit grew from US$ 573 million to 
almost US$ 2 billion during the same period 
(3.8% and 9.5% of the GDP, respectively) (see 
table 9). 
During 1979-1980 Central America had con-
siderable access to public and especially to pri-
vate international financing. External support 
for Nicaragua's reconstruction programmes 
contributed significantly to this phenomenon, 
and these resources partially took the place of 
domestic saving, which tended to be depleted 
rapidly by reason of public-sector deficits and the 
flight of private capital. In 1977 only 13.0% of 
total saving came from external sources, but that 
figure had increased to 46.4% in 1981 (see table 
10). During the same period, the region's exter-
nal public debt mounted from US$ 2.4 billion to 
US$ 7.7 billion, and factors limiting several 
countries' capacity for additional borrowing 
were thrown into relief. This last circumstance, 
combined with the constraints on the availability -
of new resources (the commercial banking sys-
tem considers the region to be a high financial 
and political risk, while official sources have 
tended to diminish due to the austerity policies of 
Table 10 
CENTRAL AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF INVESTMENT AND SAVING, 1977 TO 1981 
(Million of Central American pesos) 
Central America 
Gross domestic product at 
market prices 
Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 
Public 
Private 
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Table 10 (conclusion) 
El Salvador 
Gross domestic product at 
market prices 
Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 
Public 
Private 
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Gross fixed investment 
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Source: ECLA on the basis of official data. 
a
 Provisional figures. 
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the donor countries), has created serious diffi-
culties since 1981 in obtaining net financing, and 
in 1982 external saving—far from offsetting the 
downward movement in national savings— con-
tributed to the trend. 
In 1980-1981 the level of economic activity in 
the region would Have been even lower if it had 
not been for public and private net external 
financing (this, rose from US$864 million to 
US$ 1 728 million between 1977 and 1980) and 
if some countries had not used the international 
monetary reserves which they still had available. 
Nevertheless, this latter source was quickly ex-
hausted, arid by the first quarter of 1982 all the 
countries, without exception, had negative net 
reserves. 
Thçre was also an intense and persistent 
flight of capital throughout the region (in some 
countries more than others), owing to economic 
and especially non-economic factors which 
aggravated each country's external position and 
thus decisively influenced the drop in economic 
activity. 
Furthermore, exogenous factors not only 
had an impact on the evolution of the economies; 
they also influenced political events. As noted 
below, significant changes occurred towards the 
end of the 1970s in the political interaction of the 
region, especially in Nicaragua. Just as the long 
period of postwar economic expansion had 
reached a turning-point, the social and political 
structures too had had to undergo a major shift. 
These events gave rise to a heterogeneous 
alliance which challenged the ruling regime in 
Nicaragua. It was not by accident, however, that 
the changes in Nicaragua —like those in Guate-
mala, El Salvador and Honduras in the 1940s— 
occurred at a time when United States foreign 
policy was aimed at promoting orderly change 
based on principles which that country recog-
nizes as valid. Thus, during a brief interlude the 
geopolitical boundaries referred to earlier were 
extended, and the challenge launched in one of 
the countries against the traditional develop-
ment model became viable. 
3. The challenge to the 
'superimposed development' model 
The programme adopted by the National Recon-
struction Government of Nicaragua deviates 
from the well-known traditional norms. In a 
different context, the events in El Salvador also 
diverge from the model of 'superimposed de-
velopment' in so far as they have led to changes 
which, in one way or another, alter the pre-
existing structures. It could even be said that, 
under the twofold onslaught of the economic 
crisis and the threat to the status quo, it is unlikely 
that the pre-existing structures will be able to 
survive in some countries without fundamental 
adjustments. This in no way predetermines the 
nature of the social organizations which might 
eventually replace the preceding ones, nor their 
ideological leanings; it only means that the post-
war model which has been in effect for more 
than 30 years may have run its course. 
Some of the economic phenomena which are 
at once the object and the subject of the crisis 
clearly illustrate what has just been said. One 
such phenomenon is capital accumulation. In-
vestment has been shrinking considerably since 
1978 both as a result and as a cause of the reduc-
tion in economic activity, the drop in domestic 
savings, the flight of capital and the reaction of 
the private sector to the political and social ten-
sions by which the region is shaken. Table 10 
shows that the domestic saving of the five coun-
tries fell from 19.9% to 9.3% of the gross domes-
tic product in 1981 —a serious situation for 
countries which are attempting to develop. Pri-
vate investment also suffered a marked reverse: 
it diminished in all of the countries. The regional 
coefficient of private investment dwindled from 
14% in 1978 to less than 9% in 1981, while in the 
countries disturbed by civil unrest, the coeffi-
cient of private capital formation has plummeted 
by 50% in the last five years. The public sector 
made an effort to counteract this decrease 
—thereby accentuating another long-standing 
imbalance in the Central American economies: 
the public finance deficit— but it was not 
enough; the coefficient of total investment de-
clined in all the countries and tended to create 
bottlenecks in areas where public spending can-
not serve as a substitute for private investment. 
The deliberate efforts made by governments 
to counteract the reduction in economic activity, 
at a time when there was a downward trend in tax 
revenues, raised the proportion of the regional 
cop represented by public spending from 17.7% 
in 1977 to 21.3% in 1981, while the coefficient of 
taxation fell from 12.9% to 11.6% during the 
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same period. As a result of the asymmetry in the 
patterns of expenditure and income, the aggre-
gate deficit of the five governments increased 
from 460 million Central American pesos in 
1977 (3% of GDI-) to more than 1.6 billion pesos in 
1981 (7.8% of GDP) (see table 11). In view of the 
lack of sufficient external financing to cover the 
deficits, domestic financing was used, but this 
expedient indirectly exacerbated the disequilib-
rium in the balance of payments —through the 
imported component of expenditure— and, in 
some cases, absorbed most of the expansion in 
domestic credit, thereby taking away resources 
from the national private sectors. Thus forces 
came into play which are tending to destroy, or 
already have destroyed, the traditional stability 
of prices in the countries of the region —yet 
another manifestation of the gradual functional 
impoverishment of the pre-existing structures. 
even had difficulties in covering their debit bal-
ances. At first, the central banks of the countries 
with surpluses extended bilateral credit lines, 
and later a regional mechanism was established 
to deal with the same problem multilaterally (the 
Central American Common Market Fund). 
H o w e v e r , w h e n t h e s e e x p e d i e n t s w e r e 
exhausted5 —and when sufficient backing from 
the international community was not forthcom-
ing— the lack of foreign exchange began to limit 
intra-Central American trade. 
The response of some countries to the con-
straints on their external sector was to adopt 
exchange measures (variations in parity, adop-
tion of multiple rates or of controls on the move-
ment of foreign exchange) which affected the 
terms of trade at the inter-Central American 
level and, in some cases, limited the volume of 
4. Effects on intra-Central American co-operation 
T h e external sector constraints —reflected in the 
shortage of foreign exchange— have worsened 
to such an extent that, as from 1981, the coun-
tries with deficits in intra-regional trade have 
r
'At the end of December 1982, the debts contracted by 
the countries in order to keep up their trade in previous 
months came to over US$ 240 million: a debt so large that it 
exhausted the financing capacity both of the countries en-
joying a trade surplus and of the multilateral mechanisms 
mentioned. 
Table 11 
CENTRAL AMERICA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DEFICITS, 1976 TO 1981 
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Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
a
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commercial transactions. As a result of all these 
phenomena, intra-regional trade ceased to play 
its traditional role as a factor capable of offsetting 
cyclical lows in extra-regional trade and became 
one more victim of the crisis in the external sec-
tor. Thus, in 1982 it was estimated that the value 
of this trade would lessen by almost 20% (from 
925 million Central American pesos in 1981 to 
750 million pesos in 1982) and that its relative 
share of the region's total exports would shrink 
from 21.1% to 19.3%. 
One of this situation's innumerable effects 
on the productive apparatus was that the degree 
of industrialization (which, as already noted, had 
increased consistently between 1950 and 1978) 
stagnated, decreasing from 17.1% in 1978 to 
16.2% in 1982. In other words, industrialization, 
whose expansion had been more dynamic than 
that of the economy as a whole during the boom, 
has turned out to be less dynamic than the 
economy as a whole during the recession. 
Despite the fact that the Central American 
governments have traditionally been, and con-
tinue to be, successful in keeping the sphere of 
economic co-operation separate from the sphere 
of political relations, the growing ideological 
heterogeneity now poses a latent threat that polit-
ical differences will spill over into the sphere of 
economic co-operation precisely at the time 
when intra-regional co-operation is most needed 
in order to mitigate the effects of the external 
sector problems. In addition, the danger of inter-
nationalization of intra-regional conflicts could 
lead to a greater fragmentation of the Central 
American Isthmus and a repetition of painful 
historical episodes. 
5. Summary 
In short, the region is living through a critical 
situation of unprecedented magnitude and 
depth. Economic activity has been diminishing, 
and this has been accompanied by growing exter-
nal imbalances as well as by a sharp downturn in 
the levels of public sector saving and investment, 
together with an ever-narrowing radius of action 
for overcoming these disequilibria. 
The high and rising levels of overt unem-
ployment and underemployment suggest that 
the long-standing inequalities of the Central 
American economies will tend to worsen. The 
prolonged depression and the limited capacity of 
some of the countries for external borrowing 
have required the adoption of adjustment prog-
rammes —some in accordance with commit-
ments to the International Monetary Fund— 
which involve the adoption of unpopular econ-
omic policies. 
Moreover, the region is experiencing an in-
tense political upheaval which is closely related to 
the above-mentioned economic phenomena, 
and all this may be the prelude to a breakdown of 
'superimposed development' at a time when it is 
still not possible to glimpse the features of any 
alternative development model. What is more, 
given the unpromising economic prospects 
already described, not even the most optimistic 
view of things could counsel embarking on social 
transformations, yet without them the political 
stability of various countries in the region is in 
danger. 
The intensity of the crisis has given rise to an 
atmosphere of demoralization which no one 
knows how to tackle and overcome. Unanswered 
questions, and even bewilderment, arise out of 
the realization that many problems surpass the 
constituted governments' capacity for action and 
are beginning to erode the very foundations of 
the process of Central American integration. 
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IV 
Short-term prospects 
1. Alternative scenarios and the need to adapt 
the Central American development style to 
the new circumstances 
If the international economy had retained the 
characteristics which it had at the end of the 
Second World War, there can be little doubt that 
for economies with small markets such as those 
of Central America, the best and perhaps the 
only way of raising the levels of well-being of 
their population would have been to seek their 
dynamic incorporation into external trade flows, 
although not necessarily in the same forms as in 
the past. 
In effect, because of the scale and character-
istics of the markets of the Central American 
countries —even when considered as a whole— 
there can be no doubt that, regardless of whatev-
er set of economic policies may be adopted in 
each country to stimulate its own economy and 
promote more equitable distribution of the fruits 
of development, external demand would have to 
continue playing a decisive role in determining 
levels of product ion, while external supply 
would perform an equally vital function in 
meeting the needs of the region. In other words, 
regardless of the development style which each 
country might select, it would be absurd to think 
of any possibility of Central American develop-
ment in isolation from international trade flows. 
It would be equally mistaken, however, to 
pin all the region's hopes on a development 
strategy oriented towards external markets 
whose evolution depends on many imponder-
able factors. At the very least, it must be taken 
into account that the industrialized economies 
—and the international economy in general— 
may have to cope with far-reaching structural 
changes whose consequences are impossible to 
predict. Is the world facing a prolonged period 
of recession or very slow expansion, with only 
limited possibilities of reactivating international 
trade and even with the danger that trade flows 
may continue to shrink? Or may it perhaps be 
possible, in contrast, to achieve rapid and sus-
tained reactivation of the main industrial pow-
ers, as some authors maintain, on the basis of 
highly advanced technological activities such as 
genetic engineering, microelectronics and robot-
ization? If the industrialized economies were 
reactivated on these new technical bases, then 
what consequences could result from this for the 
Central American countries, whose capacity of 
adaptation to new circumstances is much smal-
ler? In spite of the many studies on the topic 
published recently both in academic circles and 
by international and intergovernmental orga-
nizations, the complex set of factors intervening 
in the international crisis means that any forecast 
which is made can only be mere speculation. 
It might, however, be assumed as a realistic 
hypothesis that the prolonged boom period of 
the industrialized economies in recent decades 
has reached its turning-point, and that the 
period of adjustment to a new situation whose 
features are still to be defined must necessarily be 
relatively long. Furthermore, during this period 
the developing countries in general and the Cen-
tral American countries in particular will not be 
in conditions similar to those which prevailed in 
recent years. In particular, the possibility of pro-
curing large amounts of external financing is 
likely to be constrained not only by the limita-
tions associated with the countries' own capacity 
for borrowing or for attracting direct invest-
ment, but also by the contraction in the availabil-
ity of public and private international resources 
as a result of the drop in the oil-exporting coun-
tries' surpluses, the austerity policies forming 
part of the adjustment process in the industrial-
ized economies, the debt problems of the de-
veloping countries, and the difficulties experi-
enced by the official multilateral bodies in replen-
ishing their capital. 
Even if the international economic crisis sub-
sequently turned out to be a mere depressive 
cycle —albeit the most serious since the war—, 
followed by a recovery phase (which apparently 
has already begun in the United States), the posi-
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tive effects of the latter on the Central American 
countries could only be very limited during the 
next two years in view of the considerable burden 
represented for almost all of them by their 
accumulated external debt, the depletion of their 
international monetary reserves, and the pro-
found maladjustments —difficult to set right in 
the short term— which the recent recession must 
have caused in their production capacity and 
social structure. 
Nor is it possible to think of an economic 
reactivation based on the recovery of domestic 
levels of saving and investment until such time as 
the reigning climate of instability can be 
dispelled. This, in its turn, calls for significant 
changes in the pattern of political interaction in 
most of the Central American countries. As long 
as the present degree of polarization of political 
tendencies, which have boiled over into 
situations of violence, is maintained, and until a 
way is found to improve the real and full partici-
pation of the broad masses in political life, it is 
difficult to see how it can be possible to restore 
social stability and thus enable attention to be 
turned to the attainment of objectives connected 
with material well-being. It has already been 
noted that the challenges to the traditional 
structures in some countries foreshadow a break 
with the past, but the characteristics of the social 
order which may emerge in each of the countries 
as a consequence of the complex phenomena 
described are still far from clear. 
Be that as it may, unless the indispensable 
corrective measures are adopted soon, the 
present situation —which is already critical— will 
inevitably tend to deteriorate still further, with 
unforeseeable and even unmanageable conse-
quences. In the economic sphere of each indi-
vidual country, nothing can be foreseen at 
present but rising unemployment, a drop in real 
per capita income, declining levels of saving and 
investment, and persistent flights of capital. At 
the regional economic level, the important 
advances in intra-Central American co-oper-
ation achieved in 30 years of resolute effort 
could crumble in face of the dual problem of 
the shortage of foreign exchange (which has 
led to the adoption of national measures whose 
consequences include restrictions on reciprocal 
trade) and the tensions arising from the 
increasing internal division of some countries 
or their likewise increasing ideological het-
erogeneity. 
In the political sphere, the events of recent 
times have aroused the interest of the interna-
tional community and led to an increased pres-
ence of external actors on the Central American 
stage. The entrance of new international forces 
on this stage and the depth of the economic crisis 
form a potentially explosive combination. The 
great risk attendant on the search for external 
allies on the part of the different actors confront-
ing one another in the arena of Central Amer-
ican domestic policy lies in the probable interna-
tionalization of national conflicts along the split 
down the middle of the international political 
system. 
In short, the domestic and external, econom-
ic and extra-economic circumstances which 
gave rise to the evolution of the Central Amer-
ican economies and societies in the thirty years 
after the end of the Second World War are now 
totally altered. 
The Central American governments, both 
individually and collectively, must obviously do 
all they can to prevent such unfavourable ten-
dencies from getting the upper hand. Otherwise, 
the future awaiting the Central American coun-
tries —subject to differences of degree between 
one and another— would be to pass from the 
relatively dynamic economic progress of the last 
30 years to a downward path which would vir-
tually lead back to the subsistence economy, 
while the growing political polarization foreshad-
ows an increasing degree of authoritarianism 
and even the risk of violent conflicts extending 
beyond the purely national sphere. These future 
prospects could also include the ruin of the eco-
nomic co-operation efforts carried out so enthu-
siastically in past decades. 
2. Requirements of a development style fitted to 
the new circumstances 
Recognition that the circumstances now faced 
are markedly different from those prevailing in 
the period following the war would constitute the 
first step for governments in moving towards a 
qualitatively different policy. In recent years, the 
international economy, instead of being a reli-
able source of support for the growth of the 
countries of the region, has become a source of 
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instability, and as has happened so many times in 
the history of Central America, it has set a limit 
—and a strict one— to the expansion of their 
economies. The recent changes in the political 
sphere, for their part, together with the tradi-
tional tendency to look abroad for explanations 
and solutions, constitute new risks, especially for 
intra-Central American co-operation. 
The countries of the region would do ill to 
resign themselves to meekly suffering the con-
sequences of an adverse external environment. 
Rather should they seek to expand their room 
for manoeuvre with the aim of gaining some 
degree of autonomy —no matter how modest it 
may be— without of course sacrificing the possi-
bility of taking advantage of such dynamic im-
pulses as the international economy may con-
tinue to generate. The ultimate objective pur-
sued should be Central America's continuous 
advance towards greater control of its own des-
tiny, both in the economic and in the political 
field. 
In the first of these fields, it is not a matter of 
proposing Utopian solutions such as, for exam-
ple, trying to partly isolate the countries from the 
international flows, but neither is it a matter of 
passively accepting with folded arms, the cost of 
adaptation to the uncertain and adverse situation 
of the international economy. A realistic but mo-
re active approach would require that the coun-
tries, besides taking advantage of the opportuni-
ties offered by the internat ional economy, 
should seek ways of reducing the vulnerability of 
their economies through the creation of alterna-
tive poles of development and modification of 
the traditional patterns of consumption and ac-
cumulation. In the second of these fields, what 
would be called for would be an explicit recogni-
tion by the Central American governments of the 
fact that international circumstances make it nec-
cesary to draw a distinction between economic 
aid proper and aid which may imply the interfe-
rence of external actors seeking to internationali-
ze national and intra-regional conflicts. 
No claim is made here to spell out in detail 
the characteristic of a Central American develop-
ment strategy in keeping with the new economic 
circumstances. Unfortunately, there are no set 
economic policy models for tackling the problem 
of the reduced opportunities in the international 
economy or the uncertain situation prevailing in 
each of the economies of Central America and in 
the region as a whole. A first approximation, 
however, could be to identify the essential re-
quirements of a more active approach to adjust-
ment and to ways of offsetting the dominant 
recessive trends. These requirements would co-
me to form part of a development style whose 
concrete expression, in view of the non-existence 
of theoretical solutions, would have to be gradua-
lly perfected through successsive approxima-
tions as a function of each country's current and 
particular demands. 
i) Definition of the structure of production desired. 
The first requisite in a development style qualita-
tively different from that prevailing in the past 
would be to define with some precision the sec-
toral and subsectoral priorities of an economic 
policy aimed at selective reactivation of produc-
tion. In this respect, the countries of the region 
could adopt a pragmatic approach consisting in 
taking maximum advantage of the possibilities 
which the international market might continue 
to offer, while at the same time giving a vigorous 
impulse to efficient import substitution. In 
effect, the region as a whole represents a suffi-
ciently large resource base for appreciably ex-
panding and diversifying the present production 
capacity without incurring disproport ionate 
costs. 
As regards production for external markets, 
for example, there is no reason why Central 
America should resign itself to limiting its ex-
ports to five or six basic products; thanks to its 
resource endowment and its geographical loca-
tion there are, in spite of the uncertainty of inter-
national market prospects, obvious possibilities 
for expanding and diversifying sales of a whole 
range of products derived from the agricultural 
sector. These include fruit, vegetables, meat, 
dairy products, marine products and chemical 
inputs of vegetable origin, all capable of being 
subjected to increasing degrees of processing. 
The exploitation of forest resources, too, repre-
sents an important potential for some countries. 
In this respect, the specialized evolution of the 
manufacturing sector in the Scandinavian coun-
tries during the present century could provide 
some useful lessons for Central America, as 
could the progress made by some Asian econo-
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mies in the export of highly labour-intensive 
manufactures. 
In anticipation of the probable tendencies 
towards industrial redeployment at the interna-
tional level, the skills of the region's labour force 
should be developed with a view to participation 
—among other possibilities— in the expansion 
which will characterize the different branches of 
the electronics industry, both as regards prod-
ucts and as regards the development of systems. 
All this would be a complement to—not a substi-
tute for— the traditional export activities in 
which the Central American countries have had 
experience for decades and which would 
assuredly more than maintain their ability to 
compete on the world market. 
In short, the present limitations of interna-
tional demand should not lead Central American 
governments to give up their efforts to increase 
the generation of foreign exchange through ex-
ports; on the contrary, these efforts should be 
redoubled and new measures should be taken in 
the fields of fiscal and exchange rate practices 
and of organization of production and market-
ing so as to gain access to the markets of third 
countries. 
As regards production for domestic con-
sumption, top priority should be given to the 
supply of food —a branch in which Central 
America has achieved virtual self-sufficiency in 
the past and can do so again— and the promo-
tion of relations between agriculture and indus-
try which will make it possible to sustain and 
guarantee this self-sufficiency and also to gener-
ate exportable surpluses. In the second place, 
there is still ample potential in the region for 
industrial import substitution in reasonably effi-
cient conditions, especially if industry takes 
advantage of the economies of scale implicit in 
the regionsl market. Among the branches which 
offer the best prospects are industrial develop-
ment in connection with agriculture, construc-
tion and articles to meet essential needs. 
In selecting the activities which ought to re-
ceive support from economic policy, a criterion 
of special importance could be based on their 
capacity to generate productive employment, in 
view of probable trends in labour supply and 
demand. In this connection, it would be possible 
to select labour-intensive techniques in the agri-
cultural sector and to support manufacturing 
activities of the same nature. 
ii) Realism and pragmatism. One of the biggest 
problems that arise when formulating an econom-
ic policy is the uncertainty which largely stems 
from factors traditionally beyond the control of 
the governments of the region. Reference has 
already been made to the doubts which exist 
regarding the future evolution of the internatio-
nal economy, the changes to which the industria-
lized economies must face up, or the result of the 
relatively untried policies being implemented in 
some of the main industrialized countries. It is 
not yet known what influence these factors may 
have on the developing countries in general and 
those of Central America in particular, nor does 
anyone know what the final outcome of the grave 
political and social tensions present in some 
countries of the region will be. 
All this means that the economic policy of the 
Central American countries must be designed 
and applied with flexibility and realism so that it 
can be progressively adapted and adjusted to 
changing, unpredictable and essentially unpre-
cedented circumstances. Flexibility and effective 
responses would imply breaking with the past to 
some extent, because traditionally policies have 
tended to react passively or with considerable 
delay to the vicissitudes of the international econ-
omy. Today, in view of the risk that what will 
have to be faced is not so much a recessive cycle as 
a structural change in the world economy, it will 
be necessary to build a response capacity which 
will make it possible to take advantage of even the 
slightest opportunities and reduce as far as possi-
ble the constraints on the development of the 
countries of the region: questions which have 
particularly important implications for the con-
ception and role corresponding to the State in 
guiding the future economic evolution of Cen-
tral America. 
In the same order of ideas, the current un-
certainty and the want of solutions of proven 
worth mean that a new development style must 
adapt itself conceptually to a resolutely pragmat-
ic approach. This is not the moment to be trying 
out particular economic doctrines, as recent ex-
perience in Latin America has so eloquently 
shown. One of the results of the disorder reign-
ing in the international economy, for example, is 
that it is just as risky to throw the entire weight of 
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economic policy behind a strategy oriented to-
wards dynamic insertion into world trade as it is 
to adopt a strategy which prevents a country 
from taking advantage of the potentialities of 
such trade. Economic policy must undoubtedly 
be planned with sufficient flexibility to enable it 
to be adapted without difficulty to all the chan-
ging conditions of external and internal markets. 
In a situation of general lack of confidence 
on the part of some of the main economic agents, 
it seems completely inappropriate to leave ad-
justment programmes exclusively at the mercy 
of international economic trends and exposed to 
the play of market forces. Thus, for example, in 
view of the acute shortage of foreign exchange 
which characterizes all the economies of the re-
gion, it would be quite unsuitable to rely precisely 
on foreign exchange supply and demand for the 
fixing of exchange parities, since repressed 
needs and speculative pressures tend to value 
'hard' currencies far above what they are really 
worth. It would be equally foolhardy to depend 
only on administrative controls and on exagger-
ated centralization of the application of econom-
ic policy when dealing with maladjustments of 
external or internal origin. It must be stressed 
once again that what is needed is a pragmatic 
approach making it possible to achieve certain 
objectives and mitigate the effects of the crisis on 
employment. 
iii) Austerity. The international depression 
has been reflected in a number of restrictions 
attributable to the need to reduce imports and 
ultimately levels of economic activity. The result-
ing austerity, however, has by no means had an 
equal impact on the different strata of the 
population. The shortage of foreign exchange 
and the necessity of increasing the mobilization 
of domestic saving in view of the constraints on 
external financing, as well as that of satisfying the 
population's most basic needs, call for much 
more selective and careful use of export earnings 
and, in general, for an impartially strict pattern 
of expenditure. In short, the structures of ex-
penditure and saving will also have to be adapted 
to the new economic circumstances, and this will 
be reflected in austerity consumption patterns in 
both the private and public sectors. 
Austerity has a dual aim: to save foreign 
currency through the reduction of consumption 
of non-essential goods and services which either 
are imported or have a high imported content, 
and to increase the coefficient of saving. 
As regards the first of these objectives, the 
countries of the region must use the foreign ex-
change they manage to obtain from their exports 
with the greatest care and the strictest selectivity, 
and as already noted, this will necessitate con-
siderable changes in traditional consumption 
patterns and in the characteristics of investment. 
With respect to consumption, governments will 
need to discourage the consumption of non-
essential goods and services of external origin, 
and to take maximum advantage of national and 
regional potential for supplying demand. This 
may result in a life style different in quality from 
that of the past, above all in the middle and 
u p p e r income strata of Centra l American 
societies. Of course there is no question of reduc-
ing still further the standards of living of the 
masses who are already living below the poverty 
line. On the contrary, as stated below, what is 
envisaged is a redistributive effort which, inter 
alia, will give greater support to the satisfaction 
of the population's basic needs. 
Where investment is concerned, everything 
points to the advisability of reviewing the 
possibilities of using more labour-intensive tech-
nologies, not only because of the pressing need to 
create jobs, but also because of the necessity of 
reducing the imported component in new fixed 
capital. 
The foregoing guidelines are of use for all 
the different types of governments, regardless of 
the economic policy objectives pursued or the 
means adopted to attain them. Some govern-
ments will place emphasis on exchange and taxa-
tion policy in order to achieve more effective use 
of their foreign exchange; others will adopt 
administrative systems designed to ration the 
allocation of such resources; while still others will 
resort to a combination of mechanisms designed 
to secure selective discouragement of imports. In 
the final analysis, what is needed is to bring about 
the rational and careful utilization of scarce for-
eign exchange in order to reduce as far as possi-
ble the adverse repercussions caused by the in-
ternational economic situation. 
Improving the selective utilization of the 
foreign exchange generated by exports means 
that the governments of the region must maxi-
mize the rationalization of public expenditure 
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and reorient it towards truly essential activities. 
This is particularly important because, on the 
one hand, the persistence of the international 
crisis and other factors of a domestic nature are 
heralding a recrudescence of social pressures on 
governments to fulfil their responsibilities for 
economic development and the well-being of the 
population, while on the other hand the marke-
dly open nature of the Central American econ-
omies imposes strict limits on deficit financing of 
public expenditure because of its domestic ef-
fects an-d its repercussions on the balance of pay-
ments. In this connection, it will be necessary to 
supress luxury or non-essential spending and 
above all to advance in political détente in the 
region, so that part of the resources now devoted 
to military purposes can be transferred to the 
promotion of development. 
F u r t h e r m o r e , public expendi tu re itself 
could help to reduce the external imbalance if, in 
selecting investments, preference is given to pro-
jects which require a high proportion of national 
or regional inputs. At all events, the public sector 
will have to increase its procurement of revenue 
in keeping with its expenditure, in order to pre-
vent financial deficits from contributing to infla-
tionary demand for imported goods. 
iv) Efficiency. Another basic requirement of 
a strategy appropriate to the new circumstances 
is that is should ensure that growth is based on 
increases in efficiency and productivity. In the 
present circumstances, improving efficiency is 
absolutely essential, from the macro- and micro-
economic standpoints alike, in order to increase 
the multiplier effects of saving and investment, 
to undertake import substitution on reasonably 
competitive terms, or to maintain and expand 
exports to international markets. It is the duty of 
the State to improve the efficiency of the services 
which it provides and to encourage the produc-
tivity of enterprises by making reasonable use of 
fiscal and credit instruments. 
A significant increase in efficiency and em-
ployment in the region can be achieved without 
resorting to imports of capital goods, simply by 
making full use of the existing installed capacity. 
As is common knowledge there is a considerable 
amount of idle capacity, above all in almost all 
branches of manufacturing. There is also an am-
ple margin for appreciably stepping up the pro-
ductivity of the area under crops in the case of 
most of the region's agricultural products, even 
those where the countries have had the greatest 
success with their exports. 
v) Defence of the minimum requirements of the 
masses. If it did not prove possible to bring about 
any significant reduction in extreme poverty 
even during the 30 years of dynamic expansion 
of the Central American economies, then it is 
inevitable that this situation should grow worse 
as the economic crisis persists, since there is a 
direct interrelation between levels of employ-
ment and degrees of poverty. In the last two 
years, overt unemployment and underemploy-
ment have increased, and unless some means of 
prevention is found, this tendency will be aggra-
vated in the immediate future. 
Unless the State takes clear measures in 
favour of the masses, the depressive effects of the 
crisis —and of the austerity policies accompany-
ing it— will tend to have a disproportionately 
severe impact on these groups, which are the 
least well organized to defend themselves, and 
among other consequences this will widen the 
gulf between the governing and the governed. 
The spread of absolute poverty is unaccept-
able from any point of view. It must be under-
stood, however, that it is hard to implement a 
policy aimed at satisfaying the basic needs of the 
masses even in periods of rapid economic expan-
sion, and harder still in times of severe con-
straints, including those affecting the public fi-
nances. At all events, reducing poverty is an 
essential par t of the needful development 
approach. Without it, all efforts to overcome the 
crisis would be meaningless, since the spread of 
social discontent could render social tensions un-
manageable and make it impossible to retain sav-
ings; i.e., it would adversely affect the whole pro-
cess of investment and development. Thus, in 
economic policy top priority should be given to 
food-and-agriculture systems, especially in re-
spect of labour intensive activities. The provision 
of low-cost housing and of health and education-
al services would also call for priority attention. 
It will be necessary to find some way of satis-
fying the basic needs of the population which 
involves a relatively modest imported compo-
nent, in consonance with foreign exchange re-
strictions. At all events, and quite apart from 
considerations of equity, the political crisis in 
many countries of Central America has reached 
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a point at which it is absolutely indispensable to 
restore a minimum of peaceful understanding 
among the population. Otherwise, social instabi-
lity will inevitably be reflected in economic insta-
bility, by paralysing, for example, the process of 
capital formation and leading to a kind of State-
dominated expenditures which would be of little 
help in expanding productive activities. 
3. Implications for economic policy lines 
A development style different from that prevail-
ing for the last three decades would probably 
have to be rather more inward-looking than the 
historical model, at least in the next few years. 
Thus, if the international economy does indeed 
turn out to suffer from a prolonged period of 
stagnation or if, even in a recovery phase, it does 
not give rise to sufficiently dynamic impulses for 
the Central American countries, it is logical that 
these countries should place the major emphasis 
on domestic demand in order to provide the 
impulses required. Stress must be laid on the 
critical importance of co-operative action at the 
regional level in support of an effort of this type, 
in order to overcome obstacles implicit in the 
narrowness of the markets which cannot be sur-
mounted at the purely national level. At the same 
time, the gradual restructuring of consumption 
in a context of austerity and of a policy deliber-
ately aimed at satisfying the basic needs of the 
population would reactivate domestic and re-
gional demand, at least for certain types of goods 
and services. 
There would be no question of having to face 
the dilemma (which would in any case be comple-
tely false) of stimulating domestic demand at the 
expense of an eventual reactivation of external 
demand. A flexible and selective economic policy 
would enable the countries to take better advan-
tage of the incentives afforded by the national 
and regional markets, while it would not preclu-
de their availing themselves of any opportunities 
that the international economy might offer. 
It has already been noted that there is no set 
of models which can guarantee the efficacy of 
new policies embodying the requisites men-
tioned above. However, it will be essential 
—quite apart from the specific economic policy 
objectives which each country pursues and the 
mechanisms adopted in order to achieve them— 
to encourage saving, promote growth, and de-
fend the basic needs of the masses. In some coun-
tries, the fulfilment of such diverse requirements 
would call for the adoption of reforms which are 
long overdue, above all in the area of agrarian 
reform and taxation, and every growth strategy 
would have to pay marked attention to the satis-
faction of the needs of the masses, on the basis of 
the creation of opportunities for productive em-
ployment. 
Adherence to the historical growth model 
would mean that far from its being possible to 
put into practice minimum programmes for the 
expansion of job opportunities, all that could be 
expected in Central America would be a progres-
sive increase in overt unemployment and under-
employment. One of the essential aspects of the 
approach proposed here would therefore be to 
take maximum advantage of the resource most 
abundant in the region —its labour— in order to 
prevent the international recession from being 
reflected in still more critical levels of poverty. 
Much has been written on this subject, and to 
recapitulate arguments would be out of place 
here. It is worth emphasizing, however, that the 
main criterion which should guide economic 
policy in the coming years should be that of its 
impact on employment, with the precise aim of 
contributing one of the basic ingredients for a 
kind of new social consensus to deal with a crisis 
which is difficult to resolve with traditional in-
struments. 
The foregoing guidelines would find more 
concrete expression in the application of ex-
change, credit, taxation and public expenditure 
policies, and in the selection of techniques for 
implementing investment programmes. At the 
same time, it should be reiterated that placing 
emphasis on a more inward-looking approach 
than that historically adopted would not mean 
that there should be any slackening of efforts to 
take advantage of any opportunities that exter-
nal demand might continue to afford. In this 
connection, the non-reciprocal preferences re-
cently made available by various countries, in-
cluding the United States of America and to a 
lesser extent Mexico, might offer a new potential 
well worth exploring. 
Finally, little could be expected from the 
adoption of the economic policy criteria and 
guidelines sketched above unless a way out of the 
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social and political tensions which have arisen in 
some of the countries of the region is discovered. 
This is an extremely complex problem which 
does not admit of simple, much less of standard-
ized solutions. The intention is not to enter into 
any discussion whatever on this subject in the 
present note, but certainly to emphasize that a 
minimum of stability and peaceful and harmo-
nious coexistence —both within each individual 
country and in the subregion as a whole— is a 
prerequisite for any serious attempt at develop-
ment and at the reactivation of private invest-
ment. A way must therefore be found to make 
economic, social and political demands give place 
to a participation model in which these demands 
are sifted and ordered in open processes of polit-
ical negotiation so that they can subsequently be 
incorporated in concrete form in government 
programmes. It will also be necessary for the 
peoples of Central America to gain the fullest 
possible control over their own destinies, not on-
ly in economic affairs, as already stated, but also 
in the political sphere and in that of international 
relations. 
4. The role of intra-regional co-operation 
Beyond all doubt, intra-regional co-operation 
offers the best possibility of loosening the con-
straints imposed by the external sector on the 
Central American economies. Today, more than 
ever, it is needful to press on in greater depth 
with the programme which was begun in Central 
America nearly 30 years ago and which has left 
behind it such valuable fruits and experience. It 
is necessary to do this not only in order to take 
advantage of the more dynamic impulses which 
could be expected from domestic demand 
(understood on a regional basis), but also in 
order to face up jointly to certain specific fea-
tures of the region's relations with the rest of the 
world. This aspect has been dealt with in ECLA 
documents on repeated occasions in the past, but 
it acquires fresh interest in the present circumst-
ances. 
The aim would be, through intra-Central 
American co-operation, to enlarge the scanty 
room for action available to each of the indi-
vidual countries of the region, in order to miti-
gate the effects of the external-sector depression. 
In the short term, the only effective way of ex-
panding local demand seems to be that con-
nected with co-operative efforts at the regional 
level. There is nothing new about such a proce-
dure, since as long ago as the 1950s it was success-
fully put into practice in order to overcome the 
same obstacle, namely, the narrow limits im-
posed on growth by international demand. Now, 
however, it would be adopted in a different situa-
tion. If it proved possible to increase intra-
regional trade to the maximum, the requisites 
for the new development style mentioned earlier 
would gradually be fulfiled as more rational use 
was made of installed capacity, the influence of 
adverse external-sector phenomena was re-
duced, efficiency was stepped up —both in im-
port substitution and as regards improving the 
ability to compete on international markets— 
and even joint advantage was taken of any 
opportunities that the international market 
might continue to offer. 
All this is hindered at present by the barriers 
standing in the way of intra-regional trade. 
Clearly, it would not be realistic to defend unre-
stricted free trade which did not take account of 
the greater or lesser importance of the goods 
being traded, but it would be desirable at all 
events to keep restrictions to a minimum and 
even to adopt mechanisms giving preference to 
reciprocal trade over similar trade flows with 
third countries. Only in this way would it be 
possible to make optimum use of the region's 
installed capacity, and even to promote some 
new activities based on regional demand. For this 
purpose, the countries would need to adopt new 
procedures for financing the intra-Central 
American trade debit balances, to do away with 
certain constraints at present resulting from the 
exchange controls adopted, and, in general 
terms, to give essentially the same treatment to 
products from any other Central American 
country as to those domestically produced. 
Furthermore, as already noted, regional co-
operation is the best way of improving the use 
made of the opportunities offered by interna-
tional trade, both in order to increase exports 
—on the basis, for example, of common market-
ing systems— and in order to obtain additional 
external financing for projects and initiatives 
which are of interest to all. The strengthening of 
the Central American Bank for Economic In-
tegration and of the machinery available under 
the Central American Monetary Council are ex-
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amples of some measures which would give real 
force to this latter idea. Another initiative of 
great topical significance at present is that 
adopted by the Central American governments 
in 1981 whereby they propose to approach the 
international financial community jointly to seek 
an increase in the transfer of resources to the 
region. It should be remembered that lack of 
intra-regional co-ordination in such a vital area 
as external financing not only has a high oppor-
tunity cost —if the possibilities for joint mobiliza-
tion of a flow of resources which could not be 
obtained through individual negotiations are 
lost— but also represents a risk for the survival of 
intra-Central American co-operation. It has 
been noted that various actors on the interna-
tional scene seem to be interested in providing 
co-operation to the Central American countries 
on a selective basis, with the exclusion of one or 
more countries from their programmes. This 
type of external co-operation, far from uniting 
the Central American countries around a topic, 
would tend to separate them. 
There would be no question, of course, of 
seeking to promote instant integration of the 
economies of the region, since the obstacles 
standing in the way of such an ambitious initia-
tive are well-known. Rather would the aim be to 
make integration an effective instrument for 
helping each country, internally, to adapt itself to 
the circumstances so often mentioned here. 
Making intra-regional co-operation one of the 
pillars of this effort would simply mean demand-
ing, in the first instance, the preservation of the 
degree of economic interdependence already 
reached, while subsequently promoting joint ac-
tion to rectify or mitigate common problems. 
In this connection, some ideas could be put 
forward for reactivating intra-regional economic 
co-operation in the short term on the basis of 
concrete action in six respects: a) maintenance of 
the degree of economic interdependence 
already reached on the basis of reduction of the 
barriers erected to intra-regional trade and the 
adoption of financial machinery to ensure the 
smooth operation of such trade; b) revision of 
the Central American common tariff —on the 
basis of the technical advisory studies already 
prepared— in support of the economic policy 
guidelines discussed earlier; c) regional co-
ordination of short-term policies such as ex-
change policies, or those connected with the pro-
cesses of cyclical adjustement d) joint activities 
vis-à-vis the international community, above all 
in order to increase the mobilization of external 
finance and improve the access of Central Amer-
ican products to the markets of third countries; 
e) implementation of joint projects of multina-
tional interest, such as for example the intercon-
nection of electricity systems and co-operation in 
the exploitation of marine resources; and 
f) strengthening of the Central American in-
tegration institutions so that they can help to 
carry out the policies in question. 
5. The renewed role of the State 
In periods of intensive change, when it is neces-
sary to transform styles of growth, modify con-
sumption patterns and defend minimum levels 
of well-being of the masses, it is essential in mod-
ern societies for the State to assume an active and 
leading role in the orientation of development, 
because otherwise society would become frag-
mented or it would be necessary to cover exces-
sively high social costs. 
Furthermore, the renewal of the role of the 
State is indispensable, regardless of differences 
of political inclination, because of the need to 
mobilize the population in a participative effort 
without which development and social stability 
would be seriously imperilled, quite indepen-
dently of the scope and objectives of whatever 
economic policy each government may prefer 
and of the greater or lesser significance assigned 
to that policy. In other words, the need to adapt 
to new circumstances makes it essential to bring 
economic policy into line with different de-
mands. Likewise, it is the responsibility of the 
State to help to resolve a series of conflicts which 
are bound to arise when a development style is in 
the making which is qualitatively different from 
that prevailing in the past. 
It may seem an exaggeration to assert the 
need for the State to assume a more active role in 
the present critical situation. But analysis of the 
features of this situation shows that the public 
sector still has a certain amount of room for 
action, and this should be utilized not only in 
order to cushion the negative impact of the crisis, 
but also in order to orient its effects on construc-
tive lines. Thus, for example, the shortage of 
foreign exchange makes it necessary for some-
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one to lay down an order of priorities for the 
different importer sectors, and also to require 
that export earnings really be devoted to essen-
tial imports. It seems natural that this role should 
be assigned to the Central Banks and the govern-
ment departaments concerned with foreign 
trade. At all events, the need to rationalize the 
use of foreign exchange calls for greater 
intervention by the State than that which would 
be needed in situations of normality as regards 
external relations. 
Furthermore, this shortage gives rise to con-
flicts of interest and consequent pressures on the 
part of the various importer and exporter 
groups. The disputes which invariably take place 
in these situations can only be settled through the 
arbitration of a higher authority. In this respect, 
regardless of the combination of exchange, cre-
dit or tax formulas resorted to in order to face 
the crisis, the shortage of resources does in fact 
exacerbate the struggle between the various in-
terest groups, thus opening up—due to the frag-
mentation of demands— a larger room for man-
oeuvre which the public sector can use to advan-
tage. 
Another qualitative change in the role play-
ed by the public sector derives from its lesser 
degree of dependence on international trade as a 
direct source of fiscal revenue. The decisive role 
historically played by the exporter groups has 
been reflected in the considerable weight of for-
reign trade taxes in the public sector income, but 
This situation will tend to change as the external 
depression limits the possibilities of exporting 
and, accordingly, of importing too. As a result, 
there will be financial problems until new domes-
tic tax sources are found, but at the same time the 
vulnerability of the State vis-à-vis certain pres-
sure groups will be reduced. 
As already noted, nothing said in this study 
prejudges the degree of intentionality of public 
action in each country; the role of the 'Monitor 
State' is considered to be perfectly compatible 
with a strong and vigorous private sector. On the 
other hand, what it is desired to emphasize is the 
unavoidable need for the State to assume a more 
decisive role in order to orient the development 
"style in the light of certain objectives, connected 
with the vital common imperative of overcoming 
the adverse factors currently predominating in 
the economies of the region and threatening 
their social and political stability. 
